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Forging a Balanced Presumption in Favor of Metadata 
Disclosure Under the Freedom of Information Act 
Ben Minegar* 
Governments face a crisis in the dissemination of public 
information. . . . The crisis derives from public 
expectations for optimal informational formatting; [T]he 
crisis is the government’s ability and willingness to meet 
those demands. . . .1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On Independence Day, 1966, President Lyndon Johnson signed into law the 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), under which the public has a judicially 
enforceable right to access federal agency records with (ostensibly) limited 
exception.2 In signing, President Johnson emphasized that democracy depends 
upon qualified government transparency: 
[FOIA] springs from one of our most essential 
principles: A democracy works best when the people 
have all the information that the security of the [United 
States] permits. No one should be able to pull curtains of 
secrecy around [federal government] decisions which 
can be revealed without injury to the public interest.3 
                                                          
* Law Clerk to Chief Judge Joy Flowers Conti, United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania; J.D. magna cum laude 2015, University of Pittsburgh (Lead Executive Editor, 
University of Pittsburgh Law Review); B.A. 2009, University of North Florida. Thank you Professor 
Rhonda Wasserman for your advice and assistance on this paper and for an enlightening class on 
electronic discovery. Faculty for the University of Pittsburgh School of Law awarded this paper the 
William H. Eckert Prize. 
1 David S. Levine, The Social Layer of Freedom of Information Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1687, 1689 
(2012). 
2 See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
3 President Lyndon Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the “Freedom of 
Information Act” (July 4, 1966), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 
27700&st=Freedom+of+Information&st1=; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
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Given the complexity of our democracy as it stands today, balancing government 
transparency with privacy and security under FOIA is perhaps more vital now than 
ever. 
Since FOIA’s enactment, however, technology has seen unprecedented 
innovation. Modern federal agencies rarely create or store paper records, opting 
instead for efficient and flexible electronic filing systems and records (“e-records”). 
Government e-records make up the “modern paper trail.” As a result, public access 
to these government e-records is now fundamental to furthering the search for truth 
under FOIA.4 
As technology evolves, questions arise concerning the extent to which FOIA 
requires the federal government to disclose its e-records. One critical question is 
whether FOIA requires the government to disclose the “metadata” associated with 
its e-records. 
Metadata—or “data about data”—is electronic information that underlies and 
describes the e-record with which it is associated. Stripped of metadata, an e-record 
loses vital identifiers and descriptors, resulting in diminished functionality and 
searchability. With metadata, “vast storehouses” of otherwise unintelligible 
electronic data can be readily searched, organized, and, in many cases, verified for 
authenticity and integrity.5 For these reasons, metadata can be a powerful tool to 
ensure meaningful public access to government e-records under FOIA.6 
Though the disclosure of metadata under FOIA promotes government 
transparency, it raises serious concerns for federal agencies. Metadata may contain 
                                                                                                                                      
JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 20 (2009), available at http://www 
.justice.gov/oip/doj-guide-freedom-information-act-0 (“The basic purpose of the FOIA is to ensure an 
informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption 
and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (“[In enacting FOIA,] 
Congress sought to reach a workable balance between the right of the public to know and the need of the 
government to keep information in confidence to the extent necessary without permitting indiscriminate 
secrecy.” (citations omitted)). In 2009, President Barack Obama prompted government agencies to 
renew their “commitment to the principles embodied in FOIA” because “democracy requires 
accountability,” “accountability requires transparency,” and FOIA “encourages accountability through 
transparency.” Presidential Memorandum for the Heads of Exec. Departments and Agencies Concerning 
the Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.justice 
.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/presidential-foia.pdf. 
4 See Peter S. Kozinets, Access to Metadata in Public Records: Ensuring Open Government in the 
Information Age, 27 COMM. LAW. 22, 22 (2010). 
5 Id.; see also GEORGE L. PAUL & BRUCE H. NEARON, THE DISCOVERY REVOLUTION 100 (2005) 
(noting metadata is a “critical part of the overall functioning of a computer application,” though it is 
“not usually viewed by people looking at a screen or a printout”). 
6 See Kozinets, supra note 4, at 23. 
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privileged or private information or sensitive materials related to national security, 
none of which are subject to disclosure under FOIA. Consequently, metadata 
disclosure in response to FOIA requests may require federal agencies to expend 
substantial (taxpayer-funded) resources to sift through, redact or extract, and 
selectively release metadata. 
A democratic dilemma exists, therefore, between the public’s right to know 
meaningfully through metadata what its government is doing and the federal 
government’s legitimate interests in reducing costs and protecting privacy and 
security—all of which are essential to effective self-government. 
Despite these tensions, few would disagree that in this modern technological 
era FOIA should require the federal government to provide public information in 
“structured and useful formats” that are “socially optimized” to “best meet the 
public’s analytical needs.”7 Metadata disclosure under FOIA provides the 
government an opportunity to start down this constructive path. 
In what manner can FOIA provide the public presumptive access to agency 
metadata without sacrificing the government’s legitimate interests in reducing costs 
and protecting privacy and security? At first glance, FOIA itself appears to provide 
little guidance; the statute does not mention metadata, let alone an express 
presumption favoring or disfavoring its disclosure. Federal courts, moreover, have 
yet to recognize metadata as a public “record” presumptively subject to disclosure 
under FOIA.8 Continued technological innovation will amplify the saliency of 
these issues. Congress, agencies, and federal courts should seek to find a balanced 
solution now, rather than later. 
This article proposes such a solution. Upon request, the public should have a 
presumptive right to readily reproducible agency metadata under FOIA—absent 
affirmative proof of substantial burden or express FOIA exemption—based upon: 
(1) the public’s interest in meaningful access to government e-records in optimal 
                                                          
7 Levine, supra note 1, at 1688. 
8 In 2011, a district judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York held that FOIA requires the government to disclose metadata, but the court later withdrew its 
opinion and order based upon the parties’ settlement. See Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. United 
States Immigration & Customs Enforcement Agency, No. 10 Civ. 3488 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), available at 
http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/7-13-12%20AOS%20Opinion.pdf (ordering the 
government to disclose metadata in response to FOIA requests); http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/docs/ 
20110623_125651_metadata_withdraw_opinion.pdf (withdrawing the opinion and order based upon the 
parties’ subsequent settlement). Commentators often cite this withdrawn opinion in relation to the 
propriety of metadata disclosure under FOIA. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 1, at 1730–33. I address 
National Day Laborer in detail below. 
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formats; (2) the express language of FOIA; and (3) the illusory demarcation 
between “metadata” and the e-record with which it is associated. 
I expound upon these three justifications in turn below and conclude with a 
proposed framework addressing the circumstances and manner in which federal 
courts should require agencies to disclose metadata under FOIA. First, however, an 
understanding of the technical (as opposed to the legal) parameters of “metadata” 
is required. 
II. METADATA: A TECHNICAL DEFINITION 
As stated above, metadata is defined ubiquitously as data about data. While 
the word’s origin is debated,9 it is generally accepted that electronic metadata 
consists of structural10 electronically-stored information (“ESI”) that “describes, 
explains, locates,” or otherwise “makes it easier” to retrieve, use, or manage an 
electronic information resource.11 In general terms, metadata is often hidden ESI, 
created and recorded by a computer, that describes the characteristics of visible 
content-displaying ESI, such as a digital document, file, or email. Metadata can be 
created by software applications, users, or automatically by the computer’s 
administrative filing system.12 Importantly, users can alter or destroy metadata 
intentionally or unintentionally.13 
                                                          
9 Compare, e.g., Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, Native Simplicity, JENNER & BLOCK 
(Aug. 28, 2006), http://jenner.com/system/assets/assets/502/original/08_28_2006_Native_Simplicity 
.pdf?1314393734 (“‘Metadata’ is actually the registered trademark of the Metadata Corporation. Legend 
has it that the company’s founder, Jack E. Myers, coined the term ‘metadata’ in 1969, intentionally 
designing it to be a term with no particular meaning. The word Metadata® was registered in the [United 
States Patent and Trade Office] in 1986.”), with Cristian-Mihai, Semi-Structured or Unstructured Data? 
Metadata, ENTERPRISE TECHNOLOGY CONSULTANT (Feb. 7, 2013), http://enterprisetechnology 
consultant.wordpress.com/2013/02/17/semi-structured-or-unstructured-data-metadata/ (“The term 
‘metadata’ was coined in 1968 by Philip Bagley, in his book ‘Extension of programming language 
concepts.’”). 
10 Metadata is “structural” because it has characteristics intertwined with the manner in which an 
electronic information resource constructs and organizes electronically stored information (“ESI”). 
11 NAT’L INFO. STANDARDS ORG., UNDERSTANDING METADATA 1 (2004), available at http:// 
www.niso.org/publications/press/UnderstandingMetadata.pdf; see also SEDONA CONFERENCE 
WORKING GRP. SERIES, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 29 (4th ed. 2014) [hereinafter SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY 4TH], 
available at https://thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/3757 (“Metadata: The generic term used to 
describe the structural information of a file that contains data about the file, as opposed to describing the 
content of a file.”). A personal computer is one example of an electronic information resource. 
12 Christopher R. Meltzer, More Than Just Ones and Zeros: The Reproducibility of Metadata 
Under the Freedom of Information Act, 9 ISJLP 327, 331 (2013). 
13 Id. (citing W. Lawrence Wescott II, The Increasing Importance of Metadata in Electronic 
Discovery, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, 14–15 (2008)). 
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Metadata reveals, for example, file designations and locations, creation and 
revision dates, authorship, substantive revision history, and “hidden codes” that 
determine paragraphing, font, and line spacing within text-displaying e-records.14 
For instance, metadata associated with email may include user address information 
and the dates and times at which the email was sent, received, replied to, 
forwarded, or carbon-copied.15 Metadata related to Internet documents facilitates 
the “transmission of [digital] information” between the user’s computer and the 
server on which the Internet document is located.16 Metadata also includes Internet 
“cookies”—or text files stored within the user’s computer that “track usage” and 
“transmit information back to the cookie’s originator” to expedite Internet 
browsing recall.17 
A. Three Metadata Subtypes 
Metadata is generally divided into three subtypes: (1) substantive (or 
“application”) metadata; (2) system (or “file system”) metadata; and (3) embedded 
metadata—all of which are discussed in detail below.18 A general understanding of 
the unique characteristics of these three metadata subtypes is critical to forging a 
balanced presumption in favor of metadata disclosure under FOIA. 
1. Substantive Metadata 
Substantive (or “application”) metadata is created “as a function of” the 
application software (e.g., Microsoft Word or Excel) with which the content-
displaying e-record is created.19 This metadata subtype is embedded within the e-
record, moves with it when copied, and reflects “substantive changes made by the 
user.”20 “Substantive changes” embedded within a digital document include, for 
example, prior textual edits or editorial comments (including redline edits or “track 
                                                          
14 SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 380 (2d ed. 2012). 
15 Id. (“For example, [email] has its own metadata elements that include, among about [twelve 
hundred] or more properties, such information as the dates that mail was sent, received, replied to or 
forwarded, blind carbon copy information, and sender address book information.”). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div., 255 F.R.D. 350, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009); Meltzer, supra note 12, at 332. 
19 Aguilar, 255 F.R.D. at 354. 
20 SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GRP. SERIES, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E-
DISCOVER & DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 3 (3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter SEDONA CONFERENCE 
GLOSSARY 3D] (emphasis added), available at https://thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/471. 
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changes” within Word documents21) and data that “instructs” the computer with 
respect to the fonts and formatting to be displayed on screen or in hard copy.22 
Importantly, substantive metadata may identify who created the e-record, any users 
who made revisions or editorial comments, and the dates and times at which those 
users made such revisions or comments.23 
2. System Metadata 
System (or “file system”) metadata reflects logistical information generated 
automatically by a user’s operating system to track an e-record’s “demographics,” 
which include an e-record’s file name, size, location, and usage history.24 System 
metadata is not embedded within the e-record to which it relates but can “usually” 
be retrieved easily from the operating system in which it is externally stored.25 
System metadata may reflect authorship information and the dates and times at 
which an e-record was created or modified.26 Importantly, access to system 
metadata facilitates “more functional” interaction with related e-records because it 
“significantly improves [the] ability to access, search, and sort large numbers of [e-
records] efficiently.”27 
3. Embedded Metadata 
Embedded metadata consists of “text, numbers, content, data,” and other 
digital information the user “directly or indirectly input[s]” into an e-record’s 
                                                          
21 See Meltzer, supra note 12, at 332 n.25 (“The ‘track changes’ function . . . shows any 
alterations made to previous drafts of a [digital] document and the identities of the users who made the 
changes. . . . Though the ‘track changes’ [may be] deleted on the viewable surface of a document, the 
‘track[] changes’ are often still stored within the substantive metadata. . . . [If] [the track changes are] 
. . . not removed, [they can] reveal secret information to other parties.” (quoting Matthew Robertson, 
Why Invisible Electronic Data is Relevant in Today’s Legal Arena, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 199, 
203 (2010))). 
22 Aguilar, 255 F.R.D. at 354 (noting that because of the substantive information contained within 
substantive metadata, it “need not be routinely produced [in non-FOIA litigation] unless the requesting 
party shows good cause” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Meltzer, supra 
note 12, at 332. 
23 Meltzer, supra note 12, at 332. 
24 SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY 3D, supra note 20, at 22. 
25 Id.; Aguilar, 255 F.R.D. at 354. 
26 Aguilar, 255 F.R.D. at 354 (“Courts have commented that most system . . . metadata lacks 
evidentiary value because it is not relevant [in non-FOIA litigation]. System metadata is relevant [in 
non-FOIA litigation], however, if the authenticity of a document is questioned or if establishing who 
received what information and when is important to the claims or defenses of a party.” (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
27 Id. 
 
 
 
 
M E T A D A T A  D I S C L O S U R E  U N D E R  T H E  F O I A  
Volume XVI – Fall 2015 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2015.177 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
“native file.”28 While substantive and system metadata are “routinely extract[able]” 
during the processing and conversion phases of FOIA production (and non-FOIA 
electronic discovery), users generally cannot remove embedded metadata from its 
related e-record.29 In most instances, it exists only within the e-record’s original 
“native file,”30 meaning the e-record’s default format. This includes, for example, a 
Word document in “.docx” format, access to which is typically available only 
through Microsoft Word, the software program on which the document was created 
originally.31 Embedded metadata is typically invisible to the user viewing the 
native file’s “output display” on screen or in hard copy.32 Examples of embedded 
metadata include formulae underlying an Excel spreadsheet,33 hidden columns or 
references and fields for automatic numbering systems in a Word document, sound 
files within a Microsoft PowerPoint presentation file (known as “externally” or 
“internally” linked files), and hyperlinks to HyperText Markup Language 
(“HTML”) files or Uniform Resource Locators (“URLs”) related to Internet 
documents.34 
Embedded metadata is generally considered “crucial” to understanding certain 
e-records.35 The archetypal example is a “complicated” Excel spreadsheet, which 
may be “difficult to comprehend” without the ability to view the formulae 
underlying the output in each cell.36 For these reasons, courts have deemed 
embedded metadata “generally discoverable” in non-FOIA litigation, requiring its 
production “as a matter of course.”37 
                                                          
28 Id. at 354–55. 
29 SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY 3D, supra note 20, at 19. 
30 Id. 
31 In re Priceline.com Inc. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 88, 89 (D. Conn. 2005); see also SEDONA 
CONFERENCE GLOSSARY 3D, supra note 20, at 35 (defining “Native Format” as the original file 
structure in electronic documents, which is determined by the original creating application). 
32 Aguilar, 255 F.R.D. at 355. 
33 Meltzer, supra note 12, at 333; see Robertson, supra note 21, at 204 (“Spreadsheet and 
database output [in, for example, an Excel spreadsheet file] often contain calculations, query formula[e], 
or hidden columns that are not visible in printed versions and can only be accessed within the ‘native’ 
applications. . . . [Therefore,] spreadsheet output may be difficult to understand without the ability to 
view the formula[e] underlying the printed output.”). 
34 Aguilar, 255 F.R.D. at 355; see also Meltzer, supra note 12, at 333 n.29 (citing Wescott, supra 
note 13, at 4). 
35 Aguilar, 255 F.R.D. at 355. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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B. E-Records in “Static” Format With Accompanying “Load Files” 
As discussed above, a “native file” is an e-record in its default, original 
format, which includes embedded metadata. An e-record in “static” (or “imaged”) 
format, on the other hand, merely contains and displays a fixed image of the e-
record as it would look in native format.38 Users generally cannot view, access, 
process, or extract metadata associated with e-records in static format standing 
alone, meaning the static file’s displayed information or text cannot be 
manipulated.39 For example, when a user converts a Word document to a static 
format like Portable Document Format (“PDF”)40 or Tagged Imaged File Format 
(“TIFF”),41 the text, font, and spacing of the displayed static image cannot be 
manipulated as would have been possible in native format (i.e., Word format).42 
Before converting an e-record in native format to static format, certain of the 
e-record’s metadata43 can be processed, preserved, and electronically associated 
with its static file in a “load file.” Load files are digital files separate from, but 
directly correlated with, static files that indicate, among other things, “where 
individual pages or files belong together as documents” and “where each document 
                                                          
38 See SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY 4TH, supra note 11, at 30. 
39 Id. 
40 SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY 3D, supra note 20, at 39 (defining a PDF file as “[a] file 
format technology developed by Adobe Systems to facilitate the exchange of documents between 
platforms regardless of originating application by preserving the format and content”). 
41 Id. at 50 (defining a TIFF file as a digital file in “supported graphic file format, . . . [which 
stores] bit-mapped images with many different compression formats and resolutions” that can display in 
“black and white, gray-scale[], or color”); see also PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, 
Inc., Civ. A. No. 05-657, 2007 WL 2687670, at *4 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (“[TIFF is] a flexible 
and adaptable file format for storing images and documents used worldwide. TIFF files use [Lempel-
Ziv-Welch, or ‘LZW’] lossless compression without distorting or losing the quality due to the 
compression. In layman’s terms, TIFF is very much like taking a mirror image of many documents in 
[a] format that can be compressed for storage purposes.”). 
42 Applications like Adobe Reader XI© allow users to make comments and annotations directly 
onto a static file’s displayed image, but the reader should not confuse this functionality with the ability 
to manipulate the actual, original text, font, and spacing of an e-record in native format. See Adobe 
Reader XI Features, ADOBE, http://www.adobe.com/products/reader/features.html (last visited Nov. 10, 
2014). By way of illustration, readers would be able to manipulate this footnote’s TEXT, font, and 
s p a c i n g with access to this article in “.docx” (i.e., native) format. If, however, the reader converted 
the article’s native file to PDF, the reader would lose the ability to manipulate the original digital 
information as would have been possible in native file. Granted, the reader could add annotations and 
comments to the PDF image using applications like Adobe, but this is akin to writing comments in pen 
within the margins of a printed textbook. 
43 Embedded metadata is typically lost when an e-record is converted into static format. See 
Meltzer, supra note 12, at 333 n.28 (citing Jason Krause, Sloppy Redaction: To Err is Automated, N.J. 
L.J. 26 (2009)). 
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begins and ends.”44 Consequently, users can extract system and substantive 
metadata45 from (most) native files, input that metadata into load files, convert the 
native files into static format, and produce the static and load files together, thus 
preserving the e-record’s displayable content and metadata in two separate files.46 
III. JUSTIFYING THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO AGENCY METADATA UNDER 
FOIA 
With this fundamental understanding of metadata’s technical parameters in 
mind, a fair question arises. How can metadata—seemingly nugatory and often 
hidden digital information—promote government transparency under FOIA? 
Consider the following. 
A. Metadata Facilitates Meaningful Access to Agency E-Records 
In early 2008, the world’s economic system unraveled. Catalyzed by years of 
subprime lending, systemic regulatory and institutional laxity, and unreserved 
greed, the United States’ housing bubble burst, spilling panic into the world’s 
financial markets.47 Previously “sky-high” home prices turned “decisively 
downward,” shackling homeowners to upside-down mortgages and unsalable 
residences.48 For many borrowers, default was inevitable. The resulting ripple 
effect was soon apparent to mortgage lenders.49 
Housing markets crumbled. Investment banks felt the reverberations. The 
value of mortgage-backed securities declined sharply. Weighed down by its “thick” 
                                                          
44 SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY 4TH, supra note 11, at 27. 
45 See supra note 43. 
46 The utility of producing static files with load files under FOIA is discussed in greater detail 
below. 
47 What caused the 2008 financial crisis is, of course, beyond the scope of this article. See, for 
example, Martin Neil Baily et al., The Origins of the Financial Crisis, BROOKINGS (Nov. 2008), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/11/origin%20crisis%20baily%20litan/11_
origins_crisis_baily_litan.pdf, for a thorough account of the 2008 crash. 
48 Joel Havemann, The Financial Crisis of 2008: Year in Review 2008, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Financial-Crisis-of-2008-The-1484264 (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2014). 
49 Crippled by delinquent mortgages and in desperate need of rescue, Countrywide Financial—
America’s largest mortgage lender—sold its stock in January 2008 to Bank of America for $4 billion—a 
fraction of its market value. Bank of America Agrees to Purchase Countrywide Financial Corp., BANK 
OF AM. (Jan. 11, 2008), http://investor.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1095252#fbid=GvDsVlOpH2v; David Mildenberg, Bank of America to Acquire 
Countrywide for $4 Billion (Correct), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2008, 9:08 PM), http://www 
.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aqKE9kRcKDEw. 
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mortgage-backed securities portfolio, worldwide investment bank Bear Stearns 
(“Bear”) found itself perilously close to bankruptcy, the news of which sent 
shockwaves around the globe.50 
To stop the bleeding, the Federal Reserve (the “Fed”) brokered an 
unprecedented deal. Guided by the Fed, investment bank JPMorgan Chase agreed 
to purchase Bear at the “fire-sale” price of $2.00 per share.51 Time was of the 
essence. But JPMorgan hesitated to take on such a risk without a safety net. To 
facilitate a “prompt” merger, the Fed—through its New York regional bank—
created and capitalized a special purpose entity called “Maiden Lane LLC” to 
purchase and hold approximately $30 billion of Bear’s most volatile assets.52 In 
effect, the Fed would issue Bear a publicly-funded loan (secured by Bear’s 
poisoned assets) to facilitate a speedy, palliative merger with JPMorgan. American 
taxpayers would bear the risk of loss in its entirety—a circumstance unprecedented 
in the central bank’s history.53 
News of the Fed’s extraordinary loan stirred Mark Pittman’s interest. As a 
financial analyst and reporter for Bloomberg News,54 Pittman filed FOIA requests 
with the Fed in April and May 2008 seeking records identifying the financial 
institutions to which the Fed secretly extended “emergency” credit and any assets 
accepted as collateral therefor.55 
                                                          
50 Robin Sidel et al., The Week That Shook Wall Street: Inside the Demise of Bear Stearns, 
WSJ.COM (Mar. 18, 2008, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120580966534444395. 
51 Steve Schaefer, A Look Back at Bear Stearns, Five Years After its Shotgun Marriage to 
JPMorgan, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2013, 9:34 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/ 
2013/03/14/a-look-back-at-bear-stearns-five-years-after-its-shotgun-marriage-to-jpmorgan/. The selling 
price was later increased to $10 per share. Id. 
52 Bear Stearns, JPMorgan Chase, and Maiden Lane LLC, FEDERAL RESERVE (Aug. 2, 2013), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_bearstearns.htm; see also Press Release: Summary of 
Terms and Conditions Regarding the JPMorgan Chase Facility, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. 
(Mar. 24, 2008), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/ markets/2008/rp080324b.html. 
53 See Sidel et al., supra note 50. 
54 Tragically, Mark Pittman succumbed to heart disease in November 2009. Federal Reserve 
FOIA Release Timeline, BLOOMBERG (2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/chart/ini3jl5OaEuw. 
55 Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F. Supp. 2d 262, 267–68 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). But for one reference to the Fed’s “databases” and “spreadsheets,” Bloomberg’s FOIA 
request (reproduced in full below) did not include requests for Fed metadata or particular e-record 
formats: 
For all securities posted between April 4, 2008 and May 20, 2008 as 
collateral to the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, the discount window, the 
Term Securities Lending Facility, and the Term Auction Facility (the 
“Relevant Securities”), [Bloomberg] request[s] copies of: [1] all forms and 
other documents submitted by the party posting the Relevant Securities as 
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By November 2008, the Fed failed to provide a meaningful response to 
Pittman’s FOIA requests. Pittman and Bloomberg, therefore, filed suit against 
Bloomberg in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York seeking FOIA disclosure on grounds that: 
The government documents [sought] are central to 
understanding and assessing the government’s response 
to the most cataclysmic financial crisis in America since 
the Great Depression. The effect of that crisis on the 
American public has been and will continue to be 
devastating. Hundreds of corporations are announcing 
layoffs in response to the crisis, and the economy was 
the top issue for many Americans in the recent 
elections.56 
The district court agreed with Bloomberg.57 Following two appeals and nearly 
three years after Pittman’s initial FOIA request, the district court ordered the Fed to 
                                                                                                                                      
part of the application for the loan; [2] all receipts and other documents given 
to the party posting the Relevant Securities as part of the application for the 
loan; [3] records sufficient to show the names of the Relevant Securities; 
[4] records sufficient to show the dates that the Relevant Securities were 
accepted and the dates that the Relevant Securities were redeemed; 
[5] records sufficient to show the amount of borrowing permitted as 
compared to the face value, also known as the “haircut”; [6] records 
sufficient to describe whether valuations or “haircuts” for the Relevant 
Securities changed over time; [7] records sufficient to show the terms of the 
loans and the rates that the borrowers must pay; [8] records sufficient to show 
the amount that the Federal Reserve has accepted of each of the Relevant 
Securities; [9] records sufficient to show which, if any, Relevant Securities 
have been rejected as collateral and the reasons for the rejections; [10] all 
databases and spreadsheets that list or summarize the Relevant Securities; 
and [11] records, including contracts with outside entities, that show the 
employees or entities being used to price the Relevant Securities and to 
conduct the process the lending. 
Id. at 267–68 (emphasis added). 
56 Id. at 270; Complaint at 1, Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F. 
Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Civ. A. No. 08-9595) (“In response to the [2008 Financial Crisis], the 
Fed has vastly expanded its lending programs to private financial institutions. To obtain access to this 
public money and to safeguard the taxpayers’ interests, borrowers are required to post collateral. Despite 
the manifest public interest in such matters, however, none of the programs themselves make reference 
to any public disclosure of the posted collateral or of the Fed’s methods in valuing it. Thus, while the 
taxpayers are the ultimate counterparty for the collateral, they have not been given any information 
regarding the kind of collateral received, how it was valued, or by whom.”). 
57 See Bloomberg, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 282. 
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release the requested information to Bloomberg under FOIA.58 
In response to the court’s order, Fed attorney Yvonne Mizusawa physically 
handed two CD-ROMs to Bloomberg representatives in the lobby of the Martin 
Building in Washington, D.C.59 Both disks contained an identical set of 894 digital 
files containing tens of thousands of previously classified Fed loan documents.60 
Over the next several months, Bloomberg processed the Fed documents, the 
aggregate of which exceeded twenty-nine thousand pages and eighteen massive 
digital spreadsheets.61 Bloomberg synthesized the information contained in the 
documents with data released under the Dodd-Frank Act to create and publish an 
“exhaustive” and interactive database on its Internet website.62 Through its 
metadata-powered database, Bloomberg charted and ranked private banks and 
companies by the amount each borrowed from the Fed during the financial crisis.63 
Bloomberg’s interactive database painted an unsettling picture for the 
American public. The data revealed that between August 2007 and April 2010, the 
Fed engaged in more than twenty-one thousand loan transactions, secretly 
advancing $1.2 trillion in public money to private banks and companies around the 
world.64 The database made clear that the federal government risked public money 
on an astronomical scale to bail out hundreds of private entities—with no intention 
of informing the American public.65 
                                                          
58 Craig Torres, Fed Releases Discount-Window Loan Records During Crisis Under Court Order, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2011, 1:25 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-31/federal-reserve-
releases-discount-window-loan-records-under-court-order.html. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Levine, supra note 1, at 1719–21. 
62 Id. at 1719. To view Bloomberg’s database, see Bradley Keoun et al., The Fed’s Secret 
Liquidity Lifelines, BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/data-visualization/federal-reserve-
emergency-lending/#/overview/?sort=nomPeakValue&group=none&view=peak&position=0&compare 
list=&search= (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
63 Levine, supra note 1, at 1719. I highly recommend taking a moment to visit and interact with 
Bloomberg’s database, the URL of which is provided in the preceding footnote. 
64 Id. 
65 While I question the Fed’s apparent unwillingness to share this information with the public, I 
do not indict the Fed’s decision to make these loans, the propriety of which is far beyond the scope of 
this article (and my knowledge). This illustration simply demonstrates that metadata can be a powerful 
tool to inform the public about their government’s inner workings. 
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Commentators called Bloomberg’s work in creating the database an 
“enormous breakthrough in the public interest.”66 Because of metadata, users could 
browse Bloomberg’s database with ease to find transaction-specific information 
concerning the very banks and companies with which they conducted business. 
With metadata, Bloomberg did what the federal government “would not (or could 
not)” do: release information of momentous public importance in a “socially usable 
format.”67 Without metadata, the general public68 may have been denied its right to 
meaningfully assess “what [its] government [was] doing”—the very aim of 
FOIA.69 As commentator David S. Levine noted: 
When [government] information is presented usefully, 
the public can immediately become an information 
intermediary . . . by analyzing and exploiting [the] 
information through groundbreaking informational 
technologies. . . . As information intermediaries, the 
public can then look for patterns, correlations, and 
smoking guns in the information received and share 
those results with others. However, [when] presented 
suboptimally, the same information and data requires the 
public to initially decipher what has been produced and 
then optimize the data on its own before analysis of the 
information can commence in earnest, much less be 
shared with others. Therefore, it is no longer socially or 
technologically acceptable to put information in merely 
a good or decent format; . . . rather, the expectation is 
that it should be presented in an optimal format.70 
While compelling, I cite Bloomberg’s case71 merely to illustrate that metadata 
has power to promote government transparency under FOIA.72 Bloomberg’s case 
                                                          
66 Torres, supra note 58. 
67 Levine, supra note 1, at 1719–20 (emphasis added). 
68 By “general” members of the public, I mean those unable or without time or resources to glean 
matters of momentous public importance from tens of thousands of pages of arcane Fed loan documents. 
69 Levine, supra note 1, at 1687. Databases users agreed, commenting that “Bloomberg is to be 
congratulated for digging into [the Fed’s loan programs] and providing an interactive database to help 
[the public] understand the magnitude of what the Fed has been doing, in secret. Frankly the data is 
chilling.” Keoun et al., supra note 62 (first user comment). 
70 Levine, supra note 1, at 1691 (emphasis added). 
71 For an excellent commentary about how Bloomberg’s case demonstrates the shortcomings of 
the federal government’s FOIA response infrastructure and culture, see id. at 1717–21. 
 
 
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XVI – Fall 2015 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2015.177 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
does not reveal where policymakers may start to forge a balanced presumption in 
favor of metadata disclosure under FOIA. Court documents from Bloomberg’s case 
do not indicate the Fed contested disclosure of metadata specifically. Neither the 
district nor circuit court ruled explicitly whether FOIA required the Fed to produce 
metadata. Policymakers must, therefore, look elsewhere to solve FOIA’s 
democratic dilemma. As with any question concerning a statute, FOIA’s text 
provides the best place from which to start.73 
B. FOIA’s Text Supports Metadata Disclosure 
FOIA’s text expressly supports a presumption in favor of metadata disclosure 
if it is requested and reasonably described, readily reproducible by the agency, and 
not exempt from disclosure under FOIA’s exclusions. 
In pertinent part, FOIA provides that upon “any request” for “records” 
“reasonably describe[d],” each “agency”74 “shall make [such] records promptly 
available to any person.”75 Preliminarily, FOIA provides little affirmative guidance 
with respect to whether metadata constitutes a “record” subject to disclosure.76 
FOIA does not, however, expressly exclude metadata from its definition of a 
“record” either. The statute’s definition of a “record” is non-exhaustive and extends 
explicitly to agency “information” “in any format, including electronic format.”77 
                                                                                                                                      
72 For further examples illustrating how public access to government metadata can foster 
government transparency, see Kozinets, supra note 4, at 23 (discussing how the Miami Herald 
published a Pulitzer Prize award-winning “analysis of data relating to damage caused by Hurricane 
Andrew” in 1992, in which researchers merged public metadata related to sixty thousand “official 
damage inspection reports” with other public records to create and publish a map showing that the storm 
caused greater damage to subdivisions built after 1980 when the government approved lax building, 
zoning, and inspection protocols); Kozinets, supra note 4, at 29 n.13 (discussing how the New York 
Times conducted a computer analysis of tens of thousands of federal accident reports from railroad 
crossing deaths and injuries, leading to a seven-part series detailing lax government oversight of railroad 
crossing safety (citing Walt Bogdanich, In Deaths at Rail Crossings, Missing Evidence and Silence, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/11/national/11RAILS.html)). 
73 See, e.g., Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 211 n.12 (1993) (“A statute’s meaning 
is inextricably intertwined with its purpose, and we will look to statutory text to determine purpose 
because the purpose of an enactment is embedded in its words even though it is not always pedantically 
expressed in words.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
74 For FOIA’s definition of an “agency,” see 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1), 552(f)(1) (2012). 
75 Id. § 552(a)(3)(A). 
76 That FOIA does not mention metadata expressly makes sense in light of the time-period in 
which Congress enacted it. But even FOIA’s 1996 “Electronic Freedom of Information” amendments 
(“E-FOIA”) say nothing about metadata. See generally Electronic Freedom of Information Act 
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996), available at http://www 
.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-104hr3802enr/pdf/BILLS-104hr3802enr.pdf. 
77 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2) (2012) (emphasis added); see also DEBORAH CAO, TRANSLATING 
LAW 107 (2007) (“[T]here are two types of statutory definitions: exhaustive and non-exhaustive. 
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FOIA’s definition, therefore, readily encompasses government metadata, which—
by its very nature as structural ESI—contains federal agencies’ electronically-
formatted information. FOIA, moreover, mandates that agencies “shall” provide 
“records” “in any form or format requested” if the records are “readily 
reproducible78 by the agency in that form or format.”79 The government would be 
hard-pressed, therefore, to argue the plain language of FOIA’s phrase “any form or 
format” excludes readily reproducible metadata. 
Clues concerning what constitutes a FOIA “record” appear in an interrelated 
federal records statute as well. Guided by the canons of statutory construction in 
pari materia and the “whole code” rule,80 federal courts should look to the Federal 
Records Act (“FRA”), which defines an agency “record” non-exhaustively as 
“includ[ing] all . . . machine readable materials . . . regardless of physical form or 
characteristics.”81 Like FOIA, the FRA’s definition of a “record” readily 
                                                                                                                                      
Exhaustive definitions declare the complete meaning of the defined term and completely displace 
whatever meanings the defined term might otherwise bear in ordinary or technical usage. . . . [N]on-
exhaustive definitions presuppose rather than displace the meaning that a defined term would bear in 
ordinary usage [and are] normally introduced by the verb ‘include.’ . . .”). 
78 The requirement that an agency record must be “readily reproducible” is discussed in detail 
below. 
79 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B) (2012). These provisions are the result of E-FOIA, the purpose of 
which was to “acknowledge the government’s increased use of electronic technology” and to 
“encourage agencies to use such technology to enhance public access to government records.” Meltzer, 
supra note 12, at 339 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-175, at 19 (1995) (emphasis added)); see also Scudder 
v. CIA, 25 F. Supp. 3d 19, 35 (D.D.C. 2014) (“The use of the word ‘any’ to modify the form or format 
requested must . . . be given an ‘expansive’ reading, subject only to whatever limitation Congress 
imposed in the statute. Here, agencies ‘shall’ provide responsive records in requested forms or formats, 
so long as the agency is able to readily reproduce the responsive record in the form or format 
requested. . . . [T]his requirement applies without regard to the form or format in which the agency 
maintains the record.”). 
80 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 862 (9th ed. 2009) (“It is a canon of construction that statutes 
that are in pari materia [or ‘on the same subject’] may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in 
one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the same subject.”); WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF 
PUBLIC POLICY 1066 (4th ed. 2007) (describing the “whole code rule,” under which “interpreters must 
consider the provision [at issue] in light of the whole [United States Code] as well as the whole statute,” 
and the in pari materia rule, under which the interpreter looks to other similar statutes for interpretive 
guidance). The FRA sets forth the government’s obligation to retain records while FOIA addresses the 
government’s obligation to disclose records to the public upon request. The FRA’s connection with 
FOIA is discussed in the next footnote. 
81 See 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (2012). The FRA, as amended, relates to FOIA because it “establishes 
the framework for [all] records [and e-records] management programs” with respect to all federal 
agencies, which necessarily includes those agencies subject to FOIA. See, e.g., Dep’t of Educ., Federal 
Records Act, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/fra.html (last modified Aug. 9, 
2005) (“Federal [agency] records may not be destroyed[,] except in accordance with the procedures 
described in [the FRA].”). Notably, the National Archives and Records Administration itself equates 
FRA “records” with FOIA “records.” See United States Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., Frequently 
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encompasses metadata—i.e., electronic material that is machine readable by 
computers. That neither FOIA nor the FRA expressly exclude readily reproducible 
metadata from the definition of an agency “record” supports the conclusion that 
courts may require its disclosure without running afoul of FOIA’s plain language. 
The express language of FOIA also provides the government protection from 
unreasonably broad requests for metadata. FOIA first requires the party seeking 
disclosure to affirmatively “request” and “reasonably describe” the “form or 
format” of the “records” sought.82 Based upon this language, agencies are absolved 
from any obligation to search for and disclose metadata where the party seeking it 
does not “request” it and describe it “reasonably.”83 The burden is first on the party 
seeking disclosure to frame its request for metadata in precisely constructed, 
narrowly described terms that are “reasonable” from the agency’s (and, if 
necessary, the court’s) point of view.84 
                                                                                                                                      
Asked Questions about Federal Records Management, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/ 
records-mgmt/faqs/federal.html (last updated July 7, 2015) (“Records are defined in various statutes, 
including the [FRA] and [FOIA].”). 
82 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(3)(A), (B) (2012). 
83 See id. 
84 What constitutes a “reasonably described” FOIA request is agency-specific, but see, for 
example., Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. CIA, 898 F. Supp. 2d 233, 274, 278 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[FOIA’s] 
phrase ‘requests for records [that] reasonably describes such records’ was added to the FOIA in 1974, 
and it replaced the phrase ‘request for identifiable records.’ The Senate Judiciary Committee Report 
accompanying this amendment stated that, the identification standard in the FOIA should not be used to 
obstruct public access to agency records[,] and the amendment makes explicit the liberal standard for 
[the] identification that Congress intended. The House Committee on Government Operations Report 
accompanying the amendment clarified that[] a description of a requested document would be sufficient 
if it enabled a professional employee of the agency who was familiar with the subject area of the request 
to locate the record with a reasonable amount of effort. The . . . linchpin inquiry in determining whether 
a request ‘reasonably describes’ the records sought is whether the agency is able to determine precisely 
what records [are] being requested. . . . Federal courts’ jurisdiction under the FOIA is not limited to 
denials of requests that reasonably describe the records sought, and an agency is not the final arbiter of 
whether a FOIA request ‘reasonably describes’ the records it seeks. Thus, a FOIA requester dissatisfied 
with an agency’s decision about whether a request ‘reasonably describes’ the records it seeks may seek 
judicial review of that question. . . . [The] question of whether a particular FOIA request reasonably 
describes the records sought is a highly context-specific inquiry, ill-suited to abstract analysis without a 
formal (or at least officially acknowledged) agency interpretation of the ‘reasonably describes’ 
requirement.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 32 C.F.R. § 1900.12 (2012) (“A 
[FOIA] request [for Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) records] need only reasonably describe the 
records of interest. This means that documents must be described sufficiently to enable a professional 
employee familiar with the subject to locate the documents with a reasonable effort. Commonly this 
equates to a requirement that the documents must be locatable through the indexing of [the CIA’s] 
various systems.”). FOIA itself does not require cross-agency uniformity with respect to what 
constitutes a “reasonably described” request for agency records, but at least one federal court has noted 
that the “meaning of FOIA should be the same no matter which agency is asked to produce its records.” 
Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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Where metadata is requested and reasonably described, the agency can still 
avoid its disclosure in litigation by demonstrating to the court that e-records with 
metadata are not “readily reproducible” in the “form or format” requested.85 FOIA 
provides federal district courts power “to enjoin” agencies from “withholding 
agency records” and to “order the production” of records “improperly withheld” 
from the requester.86 FOIA places the “burden . . . on the agency” to prove that a 
request for a certain record format is not “readily reproducible.”87 But FOIA 
explicitly requires federal courts to “accord substantial weight” to agency affidavits 
declaring that a requested record format is not “readily reproducible.”88 This 
provision grants federal agencies an immediate and automatic evidentiary 
advantage over a requester asserting that e-records with metadata are “readily 
reproducible.”89 
FOIA also provides explicit protection for agencies from undue financial 
burden at the frontend of a FOIA request for metadata. “[T]o carry out” disclosure 
under FOIA, the statute orders agencies to promulgate regulations “specifying the 
                                                          
85 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B) (2012); see also Scudder, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 34 (“‘[R]eadily’ does 
imply that an agency is relieved of its obligation to fulfill a format request that is onerous, but the . . . 
second sentence in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B) . . . informs the meaning of ‘readily’ in the first sentence of 
this subsection: ‘Each agency shall make reasonable efforts to maintain its records in forms or formats 
that are reproducible for purposes of this section.’ In order to ‘give effect’ . . . to this second sentence, 
the statute must be read as requiring an agency to take affirmative steps toward maintaining records in 
‘reproducible’ formats such that they are ‘readily reproducible’ when sought out by FOIA requesters.”); 
Scudder, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 38 (“‘[R]eadily reproducible’ is not . . . synonymous with ‘technically 
feasible.’ The Court may consider the burden on the [agency] in determining whether the documents at 
issue are ‘readily reproducible’ in the format the plaintiff requests.”). 
86 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. § 552(a)(4)(C) (emphasis added); see also Scudder, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 39 (“This subsection 
plainly instructs that substantial deference is due an agency’s ‘reproducibility’ determination, but such 
deference does not amount to a blanket exemption from judicial review of the agency’s justification for 
declining to comply with a specific format request or failing to maintain records in readily reproducible 
formats, as required under the first and second sentences of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B). The House Report 
supports this interpretation, stating that “[a]gencies must make a ‘reasonable effort’ to comply with 
requests [for records] in other formats” than the format kept by agency in ordinary course. Thus, the 
Court must evaluate the [agency’s] determination of whether the instant records are ‘readily 
reproducible’ in light of the ‘reasonable efforts’ requirement.”); Scudder, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 39 
(“Although the [agency] is correct that 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) requires courts to defer to agencies’ 
determinations of their own technical capabilities and the burden placed on them in complying with 
requests for documents in specific formats, such deference is not equivalent to acquiescence, and even 
declarations invoking national security must provide a basis for the FOIA requester to contest, and the 
court to decide, the validity of the withholding.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
89 See Meltzer, supra note 12, at 361 (noting Congress included § 552(a)(4)(C) in the 1996 E-
FOIA amendments because it expected that “some ESI would not be readily reproducible and that the 
government agency requested to produce such information would have the best knowledge to speak of 
its technical ability”). 
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schedule of fees applicable to the processing of [FOIA] requests.”90 Requester fees 
must be based upon the market’s “reasonable standard charges” for record 
“search[es],” “duplication,” and “review.”91 In cases involving requests for e-
records with metadata, an agency’s FOIA regulations may require requesters to 
share in the financial costs required to search for and prepare metadata for 
disclosure.92 Agencies can readily ascertain prevailing rates for metadata searches, 
extraction, duplication, and review. The phrase “reasonable standard charges” is 
broad enough to cover costs associated with metadata redaction, extraction, and 
disclosure—even if such costs are high. Importantly, FOIA’s grant of fee-allocating 
authority to agencies is sufficiently broad that agencies can adopt regulations 
apportioning fees to requesters specifically for searching, reviewing, and producing 
metadata under FOIA.93 FOIA, therefore, safeguards agencies from the potentially 
                                                          
90 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i) (2012). FOIA specifies that: 
Such agency regulations shall provide that—(I) fees shall be 
limited to reasonable standard charges for document search, 
duplication, and review, when records are requested for 
commercial use; (II) fees shall be limited to reasonable standard 
charges for document duplication when records are not sought 
for commercial use and the request is made by an educational 
or noncommercial scientific institution, whose purpose is 
scholarly or scientific research; or a representative of the news 
media; and (III) for any request not described in (I) or (II), fees 
shall be limited to reasonable standard charges for document 
search and duplication. 
Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii). 
91 Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii). 
92 For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) charges requester fees under 
FOIA based upon a fee schedule. See 40 C.F.R. § 2.107(c)(2) (2014) (“In responding to FOIA requests, 
the [EPA] will charge [requestors]: . . . [1] Search fees; . . . [2] Duplication fees; . . . [and] [3] Review 
fees. . . .”); see also Fee Schedule, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ 
pesticides/foia/fees.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (stating, “if [FOIA request-related] fees are likely to 
exceed $250.00, the [EPA has] discretion to require advance payment [from the requester] prior to 
commencing any work”). The CIA, likewise, charges fees for certain FOIA requests. Fees and Waivers 
(FOIA), CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, http://www.foia.cia.gov/fees-and-waivers-foia (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2014) (“Fees Charged by the CIA for Processing FOIA Requests: [1] Searches: Time expended 
in looking for and retrieving material, either paper or electronic indices, that may be responsive to the 
request, including personnel hours (clerical and professional) or computer time[;] [2] Reviews: 
Professional time spent determining the releasability of a record (blacking out or redaction of text) under 
legal guidelines, excluding the resolution of legal or policy issues[;] [3] Reproduction: Generating a 
copy of a requested record in the appropriate medium, for example, paper or computer disk.”). 
93 To assist agencies in “carry[ing] out” disclosure, FOIA broadly orders each agency to 
promulgate regulations “specifying the schedule of fees applicable to the processing of [FOIA] 
requests.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i) (2012). While I did not find an agency fee schedule relating 
specifically to metadata disclosure under FOIA, nothing in the language of § 552(a)(4)(A)(i) (or 
elsewhere in FOIA) prevents agencies from crafting regulations allocating fees specifically for metadata 
production. Notably, however, no individual agency would have authority to promulgate regulations 
governing fee allocations applicable to all agencies and all FOIA requests for metadata. Centrality of 
 
 
 
 
 
M E T A D A T A  D I S C L O S U R E  U N D E R  T H E  F O I A  
Volume XVI – Fall 2015 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2015.177 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
high costs of disclosing metadata where those agencies adopt regulations 
embracing requester fee allocations. If a FOIA requester seeks metadata that is 
prohibitively expensive to review, redact, and disclose, FOIA provides agencies the 
ability to require the requester to either share in those costs or alter its request to 
something manageable for both parties.94 
Finally, FOIA’s exemptions expressly safeguard the government from 
compelled disclosure of security-sensitive, private, and privileged information 
potentially contained in requested metadata. FOIA does not require agencies to 
disclose: (1) records deemed “secret” for national defense or foreign policy 
reasons; (2) records of an agency’s internal personnel rules and practices; 
(3) records exempted by several specific federal statutes; (4) records disclosing 
trade secrets and privileged confidential commercial or financial information; 
(5) records disclosing inter-agency or intra-agency communications that would be 
privileged in non-FOIA litigation with the agency; (6) records that, if produced, 
would invade upon personal, private interests (e.g., medical files); (7) records 
compiled for certain law enforcement purposes; (8) records related to agency 
regulation of financial institutions; and (9) geological and geophysical information 
and data related to wells.95 FOIA’s plain language does not bar the application of 
these exemptions to requested agency metadata. Thus, while the government must 
provide “reasonably segregable portion[s]” of any “record” to which a FOIA 
                                                                                                                                      
authority within one agency is not necessarily a negative in the context of FOIA fee schedules. Federal 
agencies respond to varying volumes and types of FOIA requests using myriad methods. For example, 
the EPA receives approximately ten thousand FOIA requests per year using an “end-to-end” e-discovery 
service with “new procedures, processes[,] and a supporting suite of commercial off-the-shelf . . . tools.” 
See EPA, EPA Information Resources Management Strategic Plan FY 2013–15, 14, available at http:// 
www.epa.gov/oei/irmstrategicplan.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (noting FOIA requests for 
“[e]lectronic files” can include “images, videos, audio, email[,] and any other unstructured or semi-
structured electronic information”). At the other end of the spectrum, the National Park Service, for 
example, received only around 600 FOIA requests in its fiscal year 2013. See National Park Service 
FOIA Log, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/aboutus/foia/upload/FY13_FOIA_LOG_FOR_ 
WEB-2.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). Consequently, a “one-size-fits-all” regulatory scheme 
governing the allocation of fees for metadata disclosure may be unnecessary and may actually impede 
agencies from developing individualized approaches to metadata disclosure that would best meet their 
own idiosyncratic needs and response infrastructures. 
94 Of course, agency regulations interpreting FOIA and carrying the force of law are subject to 
judicial review under the Chevron doctrine. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In addition, the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”) provides 
that agency action cannot be arbitrary or capricious. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (2012). Using 
these doctrines, FOIA requesters can challenge unreasonable fee allocations in federal court. 
95 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1)–(9) (2012). 
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exemption does not attach, agencies can avoid disclosing metadata that falls within 
these exemptions, provided the agency carries its burden of proof.96 
Based upon FOIA’s plain language, federal courts can permissibly conclude 
FOIA creates a presumptive right to readily reproducible agency metadata if 
requested, reasonably described, and not exempt from disclosure. Commentators 
who argue metadata disclosure will burden the government financially and cause 
serious national security and privacy issues should take into account the plain 
language of FOIA.97 The statute creates explicit protections for the government, as 
it: (1) places the initial burden on the requester to seek and describe metadata 
“reasonably”; (2) provides agencies an automatic and “substantial” evidentiary 
advantage in litigation with respect to whether metadata is “readily reproducible”; 
(3) broadly empowers agencies to adopt regulations allocating the costs of 
metadata disclosure to requesters; and (4) exempts from disclosure metadata 
containing private and security-sensitive matters. 
C. The Illusory Line Between an E-“Record” and Its “Metadata” 
Federal courts should construe FOIA as presumptively favoring the disclosure 
of requested, readily reproducible metadata because the public has a right to real 
government e-records. A legal principle that defines metadata as conceptually 
                                                          
96 See id. § 552(a)(4)(B) (“[T]he court . . . may examine the contents of . . . agency records in 
camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the 
exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its 
action.”). The reader should not conflate the textual fact that agencies “can” avoid disclosure of 
metadata under the plain language of FOIA’s exemptions with the notion that agencies can, in actuality, 
do so practically, cheaply, and effectively. Some commenters posit that modern redaction methods have 
yet to catch up with metadata disclosure, especially where e-records are disclosed in native format. See, 
e.g., Meltzer, supra note 12, at 345–52 (“[T]he complexities of electronic information and computer 
forensics have rendered [paper-era redaction methods] ineffective for electronically stored documents. 
Any information that is redacted from the native file of a record is never fully deleted from the file and 
can be recovered.”). That current redaction technology is ineffective has no bearing on FOIA’s text 
providing that federal courts can apply the plain language of FOIA’s exclusions to exempt covered 
metadata from disclosure. Redaction technology may very well catch up, in which case FOIA’s plain 
language stands ready. In any event, it is well-established that load files containing system and 
substantive metadata can be redacted effectively. See, e.g., Lexbe eDiscovery Software & Servs., 
Redaction, LEXBE.COM, http://ediscovery.lexbe.com/resources/ediscovery-101/redaction/ (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2014) (“Don’t Forget [to] Review & Redact the Load File[:] Many [e-discovery] productions 
will include a load file that contains production or Bates numbers, metadata[,] and other information. 
Consideration of redacted documents should be given to reviewing the associated load file data and 
redacting as well if needed. Additionally, some load files include in the load file itself extracted or 
[Optical Character Recognition, or ‘OCR,’] text associated with [an e-record in static format]. If the 
document is redacted . . . the associated text in the load file should be redacted as well.”). 
97 See generally Meltzer, supra note 12 (arguing throughout that metadata disclosure under FOIA 
will lead to substantial financial costs for the government and serious national security and privacy 
issues given the state of redaction methods in 2009). Current redaction shortcomings are (we hope) 
ephemeral; FOIA’s purpose and text (in the absence of amendment) are not. 
 
 
 
 
M E T A D A T A  D I S C L O S U R E  U N D E R  T H E  F O I A  
Volume XVI – Fall 2015 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2015.177 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
divorced from its related e-record ignores the technical reality that metadata is part 
and parcel of the e-record to which it relates. The real e-record includes metadata, 
which does not stand on its own apart from its associated e-record.98 
Federal and state judicial decisions99 more fully explicate the contours of 
what makes up a real record under FOIA and similar state freedom of information 
laws. The most compelling of these decisions is Armstrong v. Executive Office of 
the President,100 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit highlighted the qualitative differences between agency records 
produced with and without metadata. Armstrong is discussed in detail below. 
1. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President 
Armstrong involved White House correspondence concerning the Iran-Contra 
scandal through “PROFS”—an early email system used by the federal 
                                                          
98 See Kozinets, supra note 4, at 26. 
99 While my research uncovered only one applicable (non-withdrawn) federal court decision, 
several state courts have interpreted state law to hold that real e-records include associated metadata. For 
purposes of brevity and consistency with the purpose of this article, I do not discuss these state court 
decisions in detail, all of which rely upon state freedom of information laws, not FOIA. Nonetheless, 
these decisions provide persuasive authority in interpreting FOIA. For further reading, see Fagel v. 
Dep’t of Transp., 991 N.E.2d 365, 372 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013), appeal denied, 996 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. 2013) 
(state agency violated Illinois’ freedom of information law by furnishing a “locked” version of an Excel 
spreadsheet missing key pieces of embedded metadata); O’Neill v. City of Shoreline, 240 P.3d 1149, 
1154 (Wash. 2010) (“Metadata may contain information that relates to the conduct of government and is 
important for the public to know. It could conceivably include information about whether a document 
was altered, what time a document was created, or who sent a document to whom. Our broad 
[Washington public records law] exists to ensure that the public maintains control over their 
government, and we will not deny our citizenry access to a whole class of possibly important 
government information. [A]n electronic version of a record, including its embedded metadata, is a 
public record subject to disclosure. There is no doubt here that the relevant [email at issue] itself is a 
public record, so its embedded metadata is also a public record and must be disclosed.”); Irwin v. 
Onondaga Cnty. Res. Recovery Agency, 895 N.Y.S.2d 262 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (requiring the 
production of system metadata in response to a request for e-records under New York’s freedom of 
information law); Lake v. City of Phoenix, 218 P.3d 1004, 1007–08 (Ariz. 2009) (“Arizona’s public 
records law requires that the requestor be allowed to review a copy of the ‘real record.’ It would be 
illogical, and contrary to the policy of openness underlying the public records laws[] to conclude that 
public entities can withhold [embedded metadata] in an electronic document, such as the date of 
creation, while they would be required to produce the same information if it were written manually on a 
paper public record.”); see also Lake v. City of Phoenix, 207 P.3d 725, 739 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) 
(Norris, J., dissenting), vacated in part, 218 P.3d 1004 (Ariz. 2009) (“Under [Arizona’s version of 
FOIA], barring issues of confidentiality and public safety—issues not presented [in this case], a person 
asking to inspect a public record is entitled to inspect the real record. If we were dealing with a public 
record that began its ‘life’ on paper, a person asking to see it would be entitled to see it—all of it. A 
person asking to see an electronic version of a public record should be treated no differently.”). Notably, 
I did not find a single judicial decision—federal or state—holding (or even intimating) that metadata 
should not be considered part and parcel of the e-record to which it relates. 
100 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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government.101 As the Reagan administration ended in the late-1980s, agency 
officials printed and stored paper hard copies of various PROFS emails to comply 
with the FRA, under which an agency cannot destroy its “records” unless it does so 
in compliance with FRA procedures.102 The agency officials planned to dispose of 
the original electronic PROFS email files, which contained metadata describing 
electronic “[d]irectories, distribution lists, acknowledgements of receipts,” and 
“similar [descriptive] materials” not displayable in the paper printouts.103 A private 
research firm filed FOIA requests for the original electronic PROFS emails and 
sued in federal court to enjoin their destruction as violative of the FRA.104 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held the FRA required the government to 
preserve the original electronic PROFS emails containing related metadata because 
the emails constituted agency “records” distinct from their paper printouts.105 The 
court observed that the electronic emails were “qualitatively different” from their 
paper printouts because they were not “copies” or “identical twins” but, at most, 
“kissing cousins.”106 The printouts did not display “non-screen” descriptors 
contained within the emails’ metadata, meaning a “later reader” would be unable to 
“glean” from the printouts “such basic facts as who sent or received” the email and 
“when it was received.”107 With only paper printouts, “essential transmittal 
information” relevant to a “fuller understanding of the context and import of [the] 
electronic communication[s]” would “simply vanish.”108 
The court’s rejection of the government’s position that the electronic emails 
were mere “‘extra copies’” of their paper printouts was “far more than judicial 
nitpicking.”109 The court emphasized the importance of the information contained 
within the metadata, observing that: 
                                                          
101 See Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1279–80; Kozinets, supra note 4, at 24. 
102 Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 347 (D.D.C. 1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 1 F.3d 
1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1278 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq. (1988)). 
103 Armstrong, 721 F. Supp. at 347. 
104 Id. For a discussion concerning the relationship between FOIA and the FRA, see supra note 
81. 
105 Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1283. 
106 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
107 Id. at 1280. 
108 Id. (emphasis added). 
109 Id. at 1285. 
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[w]ithout the missing information [contained in the 
PROFS emails’ metadata], the paper [printouts]—akin to 
traditional memoranda with the “to” and “from” cut off 
and even the “received” stamp pruned away—are 
dismembered documents indeed. [Paper texts] alone may 
be of quite limited utility to researchers and investigators 
studying the formulation and dissemination of 
significant policy initiatives at the highest reaches of our 
government. [T]he omitted information [contained in the 
metadata] may be of tremendous historical value in 
demonstrating what agency personnel were involved in 
making a particular policy decision and what officials 
knew, and when they knew it. The “[t]omorrow, and 
tomorrow, and tomorrow” of government will be 
allowed to “creep in [their] petty pace from day to day” 
without benefit of the “last syllable of recorded time.” 
[citing William Shakespeare’s Macbeth]. . . . [T]he 
practice of retaining only the amputated paper 
[printouts] is flatly inconsistent with Congress’ evident 
concern with preserving a complete record of 
government activity for historical and other uses [under 
the FRA].110 
The court’s reasoning in Armstrong supports a presumption in favor of 
metadata disclosure under FOIA. Paper printouts of electronic documents are 
effectively identical to e-records produced in “static” format without metadata in 
accompanying load files, the production of which would omit “essential transmittal 
information” relevant to a “fuller understanding of the context and import” of the e-
record of which the metadata is a part.111 
Bloomberg’s FOIA case against the Fed—discussed above—proves 
instructive here. Like the bare hard copy printouts in Armstrong, Fed loan e-records 
stripped of metadata would have been of “quite limited utility” to Bloomberg’s 
“researchers and investigators,” who sought to “study . . . the formulation and 
dissemination of significant policy initiatives at the highest reaches of our 
government.”112 If Bloomberg had access only to static images without metadata 
containing information “of tremendous historical value,” the public might have 
                                                          
110 Id. (emphasis added). 
111 Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1280. 
112 Id. at 1285. 
 
 
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XVI – Fall 2015 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2015.177 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
been blocked from its right to access the “real record” in a meaningful way, in 
accordance with the purpose of FOIA.113 Federal courts should, therefore, rely on 
Armstrong to construe FOIA as presumptively favoring the disclosure of requested 
readily reproducible metadata. 
IV. FORGING A BALANCED PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF THE 
DISCLOSURE OF METADATA UNDER FOIA: A PROPOSED LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
As demonstrated by the three justifications set forth above, a presumption 
favoring the disclosure of requested, readily reproducible agency metadata has 
power to advance the fundamental purposes of FOIA. Such a presumption would 
assist the public in “monitor[ing] the conduct of their officials” as a check on 
government abuses. This would, in turn, “foster . . . public trust and confidence” in 
the “legitimacy and integrity of government decisions” and promote “democratic 
self-government” and “public participation” by “opening the conduct of 
government to public scrutiny.”114 
Federal courts can craft such a presumption in a way that safeguards the 
government’s legitimate interests in reducing financial burdens and protecting 
privacy and national security. To assist in this process, I propose the following 
balanced approach. 
In deciding a dispute over metadata disclosure under FOIA, federal courts 
should first require requesters to affirmatively ask for and reasonably describe any 
metadata sought, as required by FOIA. Second, courts should individually assess 
the propriety of disclosure with respect to each metadata subtype requested, 
applying the evidentiary burdens suggested below to determine whether the agency 
has proved the requested metadata is not “readily reproducible.” I discuss both 
steps of this proposed framework in detail below. 
A. Step One: The Public Must “Request” and “Describe” Metadata 
“Reasonably” 
Where a FOIA requester broadly seeks agency records in electronic format, 
federal courts should not presume FOIA automatically compels the disclosure of all 
related metadata. Armstrong shows metadata is an intrinsic part of the e-record to 
which it relates—but federal courts are bound by FOIA’s plain text, which places 
the initial burden on the public to “request” and “reasonably describe” any agency 
                                                          
113 Id.; cf. Lake v. City of Phoenix, 218 P.3d 1004, 1007–08 (Ariz. 2009) (emphasis added). 
114 See Kozinets, supra note 4, at 29. 
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records sought.115 A broad demand for agency “e-records” does not affirmatively 
“request” or “reasonably describe” related metadata under FOIA. Such a request 
does not place the agency on notice with respect to the specific metadata sought. 
Rather, it thrusts upon the agency the burden to divine the requester’s intent, in 
violation of Congress’ directive that the requester bear the initial responsibility to 
make reasonably clear the government records it seeks. To hold otherwise would 
violate FOIA’s plain text and undermine its purpose of qualified government 
transparency. Therefore, the presumption favoring metadata disclosure under FOIA 
should not activate where a party seeking agency e-records has not: (1) requested 
metadata affirmatively and formally in its initial FOIA request;116 and 
(2) designated the agency metadata it seeks specifically117 using a “reasonable 
description,”118 as required by FOIA. 
Federal courts should assess whether a FOIA request for metadata is 
“reasonably described” based upon the specific facts of each case, circuit precedent 
defining a “reasonably described” FOIA request, and the court’s own experience 
with the particular parties throughout the litigation. While federal courts should 
                                                          
115 See 5 U.S.C § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012) (“[E]ach agency, upon any request for records [that] . . . 
reasonably describes such records and . . . is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, 
place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any 
person.” (emphasis added)). 
116 Section 552(a)(3)(A)’s text plainly requires agencies to respond to “any request” for records. 
This plausibly encompasses requests for metadata made after the initial FOIA request for e-records. But 
the text also requires requesters to comply with “published [procedural] rules” governing FOIA 
requests. Agencies burdened by belated metadata requests may, therefore, craft rules requiring 
requesters to seek metadata in the initial FOIA request. This would mitigate an agency’s initial 
searching, processing, redaction, and production burden. Such a rule would compel requesters seeking 
e-records to place the agency on notice explicitly from the outset that they also seek agency metadata. 
Moreover, an agency can use this authority to draft procedural requirements for FOIA request 
amendments or even exceptions to the “initial request” rule comporting with its own unique needs and 
response infrastructure. For examples of an initial formal FOIA request letter from a private entity and a 
government agency, respectively, see Sample FOIA Request Letters, NAT’L FREEDOM OF INFO. 
COALITION, http://www.nfoic.org/sample-foia-request-letters#foireq (last visited Nov. 23, 2014); How 
to File a FOIA Request, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, http://www.foia.cia.gov/foia_request (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2014). 
117 It may be difficult for FOIA requesters to “specifically” identify agency metadata. An agency 
(we hope) knows intimately the manner in which it creates and stores its own e-records; requesters, on 
the other hand, generally do not. Agencies must, nevertheless, respond to “requests” for metadata that 
are “reasonably described.” Federal courts should, therefore, take into account this informational 
asymmetry when assessing the specificity and “reasonableness” of a formal request for e-records and 
metadata under FOIA. 
118 For examples illustrating how agencies define a “reasonable request” for records under FOIA, 
see supra note 84. Cf. Meltzer, supra note 12, at 356–57 (“If metadata is not specifically requested, the 
agency should not have to reproduce it at all. . . . [T]o have go through [the] . . . metadata [of all 
requested e-records individually] would only increase the burden on an agency and potentially worsen 
the backlogs that currently affect the FOIA request process.”). 
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duly defer to an agency’s fair and formal definition of a “reasonably described” 
request, FOIA does not require courts to consider the agency’s definition as 
dispositive. In fact, FOIA’s plain text does not require federal courts to accord 
weight to an agency’s “reasonable description” criteria.119 This contrasts sharply 
with FOIA’s requirement that courts must accord “substantial weight” to agency 
affidavits concerning whether records are “readily reproducible.”120 That Congress 
ordered courts to give weight to agency declarations with respect to 
“reproducibility” but did not do so for “reasonably described requests” suggests 
that federal courts may (and should) rely upon more than the mere “say-so” of the 
agency when assessing whether a request for agency metadata is “reasonably 
described.” 
For example, if the court construes the agency’s “reasonable description” 
criteria for metadata requesters as arbitrary or unduly burdensome, or if the agency 
fails to publish its “reasonableness” requirements conspicuously, the court may 
choose to read a FOIA request for metadata broadly in favor of the requester. 
Conversely, if a requester describes the metadata it seeks imprecisely (or not at all) 
in the face of an agency’s fair and readily ascertainable criteria, the presumption 
should not activate, and the court should not order the agency to disclose the 
metadata associated with the requested e-records. 
The (subsequently withdrawn) opinion in National Day Laborer Organizing 
Network v. United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement Agency121 
demonstrates the burdensome consequences of compelling the government to 
disclose metadata where the requester fails to formally ask for and reasonably 
describe it in its initial, formal FOIA request. There, the plaintiffs submitted broad 
FOIA requests in February 2010 merely for agency e-records,122 assuming the 
requests included related metadata. The agencies, however, produced only static 
files. In a July 2010 email, the plaintiffs responded by requesting “[E]xcel 
documents in [E]xcel file format[,] not as PDF screen shots.”123 The plaintiffs did 
not formally request metadata until December 2010—ten months after its initial 
                                                          
119 The Chevron doctrine and the APA, of course, compel judicial deference to the agency’s 
reasonable interpretations of FOIA. See supra note 94. 
120 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). 
121 Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement 
Agency, No. 10 Civ. 3488 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), available at http://smu-ediscovery.gardere.com/Natl-Day-
Laborer-Organizing-Network-v.-U.S.-Immigration-and-Customs-Enforcement-Agency%5B1%5D.pdf. 
See supra note 8 for a discussion with respect to why the court withdrew its opinion in National Day 
Laborer. 
122 Id. at 1. 
123 Id. at 6. 
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request for e-records.124 Despite the government’s argument that the plaintiffs’ 
vague July 2010 email and belated formal metadata request constituted an 
impermissible expansion of their initial FOIA request,125 the court required the 
government to disclose the metadata,126 ignoring FOIA’s requirement that the 
plaintiffs must “request” records with a “reasonable description.” The court noted 
that while “the language of” the plaintiffs’ July 2010 e-mail was “less than crystal 
clear,” it was “sufficient to put [the government] on notice of [the plaintiffs’] 
requests regarding form of production.”127 
The plain language of FOIA is at odds with the withdrawn opinion in 
National Day Laborer. As stated, metadata is an intrinsic part of the real e-
record—but it is also difficult and expensive to disclose for the government.128 In 
tacit recognition of the government’s burden, FOIA’s text absolves agencies of the 
obligation to disclose records that have not been “requested” and “reasonably 
described.” An informal request using a vague, “less than crystal clear” description 
via email to an agency representative five months after an initial formal FOIA 
request broadly seeking “e-records” should not constitute a “reasonably described” 
                                                          
124 Id. 
125 The government argued, as I do now, that “If a party wants metadata, it should [a]sk for it. Up 
front. Otherwise, if [the party] ask[s] too late or ha[s] already received the document in another form, 
[it] may be out of luck.” Id. at 12–13. 
126 Id. at 13. The court noted, “Given Plaintiffs’ July [2010] e-mail and [the government’s] tardy 
productions, I cannot accept this lame excuse for failing to produce the records in a usable format.” Id. 
As discussed throughout this article, I agree that the government should produce records in “usable 
formats”—but FOIA’s plain text places the burden on the requester to affirmatively seek what it 
considers “usable” from the outset. What is “usable” to a requester in one context may not be “usable” 
to a different requester in another. The withdrawn opinion in National Day Laborer would have the 
agency define for the requester what a “usable format” is. This is practically and textually incorrect. 
127 Id. (emphasis added). 
128 See, e.g., Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of the Government’s Motion for a 
Stay Pending Appellate Review at 8–10, Nat’l Day Laborer, No. 10 Civ. 3488 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), 
available at https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/Doc%2085%20Reply%20Mem%20of% 
20Law%20in%20Support%20of%20Def%20Motion%20for%20Stay.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2014) 
(discussing the government’s burden and arguing for nondisclosure on grounds that the agencies’ 
“existing FOIA practices [do not provide] a mechanism to review, much less redact, metadata”; that the 
agencies “have access to software that has been used in the civil discovery context to produce metadata, 
[but] such software would not provide an adequate solution” because it was “not available for FOIA 
purposes” based upon its use “in active criminal investigations”; that using such software would, in any 
event, “exponentially increase the time and expense of processing FOIA requests” and “would not allow 
for the redaction of exempt metadata,” meaning “[a]ny fields with exempt information would simply not 
be produced”; that “produc[ing] a [mere] sampling of Excel spreadsheets in TIFF format with load files 
for this one FOIA request [would have required the] FBI [to] train[] [fifteen] FOIA analysts to use [the 
e-discovery software] program on a temporary basis, [even though] the program was being utilized by 
[the] FBI’s Financial Crimes Section and reached maximum capacity as a result of that office’s ongoing 
investigations”; and that the agencies at issue receive hundreds of thousands of FOIA requests per year 
(emphasis in original)). 
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“request” for metadata under FOIA. Strict enforcement of this threshold 
requirement will ensure that the government is actually on notice from the outset 
that the requester seeks metadata, thus allowing the agency to craft a response 
protocol compatible with its particular needs and infrastructure. 
B. Step Two: Courts Should Assess the Propriety of Metadata Disclosure 
Individually by Metadata Subtype 
Assuming an affirmative, reasonably described FOIA request for nonexempt 
agency metadata, federal courts should individually assess the propriety of 
disclosure with respect to each metadata subtype requested.129 As discussed above, 
metadata exists in three subtypes: (1) substantive; (2) system; and (3) embedded. 
The disclosure of each individual subtype under FOIA raises unique technical, 
legal, and practical concerns. A blanket presumption in favor of disclosure 
applying indiscriminately to all three metadata subtypes would overlook these 
unique concerns, damaging FOIA’s careful balancing of qualified government 
transparency. A more nuanced approach is required. 
Federal courts can craft such a nuanced approach by requiring the government 
to satisfy a distinct evidentiary burden130 with respect to whether each requested 
metadata subtype is “readily reproducible” by the agency.131 As noted, FOIA places 
the burden on the government to prove that metadata is not “readily 
reproducible.”132 However, FOIA is silent with respect to the legal parameters of 
that burden. In light of this silence, and for the reasons set forth below, federal 
courts should require the government to adduce substantial evidence of burden to 
overcome the presumption favoring the disclosure of system metadata. Substantive 
metadata, on the other hand, will almost always fall within FOIA’s “deliberative-
process” exemption. In the rare case in which a party seeks nonexempt substantive 
metadata, however, courts should require the government to show substantial 
                                                          
129 Of course, if the requester excludes (intentionally or inadvertently) a metadata subtype from its 
request, the court need not address the propriety of its disclosure. In such a case, the requester has failed 
to “request” and “reasonably describe” the metadata subtype, thus absolving the agency from any 
obligation to search for and disclose it. 
130 The majority of FOIA disputes in federal court are resolved through motions for summary 
judgment filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See, e.g., Rebecca Silver, Standard of Review 
in FOIA Appeals and the Misuse of Summary Judgment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 731, 735 (2006). Because 
Rule 56 requires the court to determine whether there is a “genuine dispute as to any material fact,” 
evidentiary burdens play a central role in the disposition of FOIA disputes at summary judgment. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (emphasis added). For these reasons, tailoring unique burdens of proof to each 
metadata subtype would allow federal courts to breathe life into the presumption favoring metadata 
disclosure under FOIA. 
131 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B) (2012). 
132 See id. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
 
 
 
 
M E T A D A T A  D I S C L O S U R E  U N D E R  T H E  F O I A  
Volume XVI – Fall 2015 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2015.177 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
evidence of burden to avoid its disclosure. With respect to disputes over embedded 
metadata, courts should require the government to satisfy a lesser showing of 
burden, with one exception for embedded metadata that is essential to 
understanding the e-record to which it relates. Each metadata subtype and its 
corresponding evidentiary burden133 is discussed in detail below. 
1. Whether System Metadata Is “Readily Reproducible” 
As stated above, federal courts should require the government to adduce 
substantial evidence of burden to overcome the presumption favoring the 
disclosure of requested, nonexempt system metadata. Several factors counsel in 
favor of requiring a high evidentiary burden here. Recall that system metadata 
reflects logistical (as opposed to substantive) information used to track an e-
record’s demographics. Importantly, these include the “essential transmittal 
information” discussed in Armstrong, including, for example, an e-record’s file 
name, author, creation and modification dates and times, size, location, and usage 
history.134 System metadata, moreover, has considerable power to facilitate 
                                                          
133 Concededly, this approach may require the court to “characterize” the type of metadata the 
requester seeks in its initial FOIA request to ascertain the appropriate evidentiary burden the 
government must satisfy. This may prove difficult in certain cases given that metadata’s legal definition 
is elusive. Technology evolves, and ESI cannot always be made to fit within immutable, wooden legal 
categories. See Lucia Cucu, The Requirement for Metadata Production Under Williams v. Sprint/United 
Management Co.: An Unnecessary Burden for Litigants Engaged in Electronic Discovery, 93 CORNELL 
L. REV. 221, 235–36 (2007) (“Because there is no clear definition of the word ‘metadata,’ using it as a 
basis for law can lead to confusion.”). This “characterization” issue may lead to wasteful litigation and 
gamesmanship over whether a specific piece of ESI is “metadata” and, if so, whether it constitutes a 
particular metadata subtype. This complicated issue merits its own article—but I have a few thoughts. 
Agencies may mitigate “characterization” risks by using their broad authority under FOIA to craft 
regulations (and amendments responsive to technological developments) that: (1) define the three 
metadata subtypes in terms specific to the agency; (2) require requesters to simply “check a box” 
indicating which of the three metadata subtypes they seek in their formal FOIA request; and (3) require 
requesters to agree in writing not to litigate their subtype choice should a dispute arise. Requesters, on 
the other hand, may combat agency gamesmanship by crafting their initial FOIA request for metadata in 
reliance upon, and written citation to, circuit precedent (both binding and persuasive) and the particular 
agency’s own rules, if any, defining the legal parameters of its own metadata. These solutions are, of 
course, imperfect and incomplete. But lawyers cannot escape that we must formulate and apply, as 
President Barack Obama once noted, narrow rules and arcane procedure to an uncooperative reality. See 
generally BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND INHERITANCE (2004); 
cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has not been logic; it 
has been experience. . . . The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, 
and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.” 
(emphasis added)). 
134 See Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div., 255 F.R.D. 350, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (noting system metadata is “relevant” in non-FOIA litigation “if the authenticity of a document is 
questioned or if establishing ‘who received what information and when’ is important to the claims or 
defenses of a party” (internal citations omitted)); cf. Meltzer, supra note 12, at 334 n.34 (“The 
production of system metadata has the least potential for devastating consequences if it [is] released to 
the public, as it typically does not store any confidential or personally identifiable information. In non-
FOIA . . . cases, courts have commented that most system metadata lacks evidentiary value because it is 
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meaningful access to government e-records because it “significantly improves” the 
“ability to access, search, and sort large numbers of [e-records] efficiently.”135 
System metadata’s power to promote government transparency, combined 
with the relative ease with which it can be extracted,136 supports that the 
government should disclose it upon reasonable request, absent proof of 
exceptionally burdensome circumstances or express FOIA exemption. 
Procedurally, therefore, federal courts should require agencies to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that requested, nonexempt system metadata is not “readily 
reproducible.”137 If the agency fails to make this showing, the court should require 
the government to disclose the requested e-records in static format with 
accompanying load files containing requested system metadata,138 redacted as 
necessary for applicable FOIA exemptions. 
                                                                                                                                      
not relevant. In addition, courts have generally only found system metadata relevant if the requesting 
party is trying to establish who received what information and when. Because system metadata is 
created automatically by the user’s application or operating system[,] system metadata can potentially 
provide an objective means of authenticating many electronic documents. However, despite the date and 
time stamps that are automatically created an individual who alters a document may not be the 
individual that the operating system says.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 
also SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY 3D, supra note 20, at 22. 
135 See Aguilar, 255 F.R.D. at 354. 
136 Id. 
137 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 80, at 636 (“[C]lear and convincing evidence [is] 
evidence indicating that the thing to be proved [i.e., for our purposes, whether system metadata is 
‘readily reproducible’ by the agency] is highly probable or reasonably certain. This is a greater burden 
than preponderance of the evidence, the standard applied in most civil trials. . . .”); Price v. Symsek, 988 
F.2d 1187, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[C]lear and convincing evidence [is] evidence [that] produces in the 
mind of the trier of fact an abiding conviction that the truth of a factual contention is highly probable.” 
(emphasis added)). The potential factors relevant to determining the “reproducibility” of system 
metadata are myriad and infinitely agency-specific. Consequently, I intentionally omit them here (after 
several abortive attempts at crafting a comprehensive set thereof). A federal court should, therefore, 
assess the factors relevant to the particular request and agency before it, deciding whether the agency 
has adduced evidence in satisfaction of its burden. For the court to grant summary judgment in favor of 
the agency, for instance, the agency must show that a rational trier of fact could conclude from the 
record before it that the agency has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the requested system 
metadata is not “readily reproducible.” See generally Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 
(1986) (describing Rule 56’s summary judgment standard). This test should be exacting and difficult for 
the government to overcome, notwithstanding FOIA’s direction that courts must accord “substantial 
weight” to agency declarations concerning whether records are “readily reproducible.” See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(4)(C) (2012). 
138 Cf. Aguilar, 255 F.R.D. at 356–57 (“[I]n an effort to replicate the usefulness of native files 
while retaining the advantages of static productions [with respect to non-FOIA litigation], image format 
productions typically [should be] accompanied by load files, which are ancillary files that may contain 
textual content and . . . system metadata. . . . Weighing the advantages and disadvantages of different 
forms of production, . . . it is sufficient to produce . . . [e-]records in PDF or TIFF format accompanied 
by a load file containing searchable text and selected metadata. [This is adequate because] production is 
in usable form, e.g., electronically searchable and paired with essential metadata.” (citations omitted)); 
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2. Whether Substantive Metadata Is “Readily Reproducible” 
Substantive metadata is particularly troublesome. FOIA makes it extremely 
difficult for requesters to access it. In nearly every case, an agency’s substantive 
metadata will fall readily within FOIA’s “deliberative-process” exemption under § 
552(b)(5). As a result, disputes over whether substantive metadata is “readily 
reproducible” will arise only in the rare and extraordinary case, if at all. 
FOIA’s deliberative-process exemption shields from disclosure “pre-
decisional” and “deliberative” agency communications.139 Recall that substantive 
metadata reflects “substantive changes” to an e-record “made by the user.”140 These 
include, for example, track changes or textual revisions made by agency personnel 
in a Word document setting forth a draft agency regulation.141 FOIA requests for 
these track changes and revisions will generally fall squarely within FOIA’s 
deliberative-process exemption. These substantive alterations are: (1) inherently 
“pre-decisional,” as draft revisions are necessarily antecedent to the adoption of the 
agency’s final policy decision; and (2) inherently “deliberative,” as they merely 
make recommendations or express opinions with respect to the agency’s legal or 
policy matters still in deliberation. 
                                                                                                                                      
see also Meltzer, supra note 12, at 362–64 (“If [the court orders metadata disclosure under FOIA], the 
agency should only reproduce the metadata . . . in static form with accompanying load files. To mandate 
that an agency reproduce a record in native format . . . would be to mandate that an agency must expose 
itself to the risk that sensitive information is recovered by an enterprising adversary or organization. 
Producing a document in static form drastically decreases the possibility that any information that is 
redacted by an agency will be recovered. . . . This would ensure that the requester receives the requisite 
metadata without the high risk of exposing exempt information . . . [while also ensuring] that the records 
produced [are] still in a readable and usable format [for] the requesting party. . . .”). 
139 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012) (exempting from disclosure agency communications that 
would be exempt in non-FOIA litigation with the agency, which encompasses the deliberative-process 
privilege); cf. Am. Immigration Council v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F. Supp. 2d 221, 
239 (D.D.C. 2013) (“The deliberative-process privilege [encompassed within FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(5),] calls for disclosure of all opinions and interpretations [that] embody the agency’s effective 
law and policy, while withholding all papers which reflect the agency’s group thinking in the process of 
working out its policy and determining what its law shall be. In order to justify a withholding under this 
privilege, the government must prove two basic elements. First, it must demonstrate that the document 
qualifies as ‘pre-decisional’ in the sense that it was antecedent to the adoption of an agency policy. 
Second, the government must show that the document forms a direct part of the deliberative process in 
that it makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). For an excellent discussion explaining why substantive metadata will almost always 
fall within FOIA’s deliberative-process exemption see, Meltzer, supra note 12, at 357–60. 
140 See SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY 3D, supra note 20, at 22. 
141 See Meltzer, supra note 12, at 332 & n.25 (citing Robertson, supra note 21, at 203) (“The 
‘track changes’ function . . . shows any alterations made to previous drafts of a document and the 
identities of the users who made the changes. . . . Though the ‘track changes’ [may be] deleted on the 
viewable surface of a document, the ‘tracked changes’ are often still stored within the substantive 
metadata . . . [and] if it is not removed, [it can] reveal secret information to other parties.”). 
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Of course, the government bears the burden of proving that FOIA’s 
deliberative-process exemption shields requested substantive metadata from 
disclosure.142 But the government’s evidentiary burden with respect to whether § 
552(b) exempts a requested record from disclosure has been historically light.143 
There is no reason to think this lighter burden would (or should) change where the 
parties dispute whether substantive metadata falls within the deliberative-process 
exemption. After all, “the ultimate objective” of the exemption “is to safeguard the 
deliberative process of agencies, not the [mere] paperwork generated in the course 
of that process.”144 Requests for substantive metadata will most often seek access to 
the agency’s deliberative process, thereby activating the exemption. 
In the rare case in which an agency cannot show that requested substantive 
metadata falls within FOIA’s deliberative-process exemption, however, the court 
should require its disclosure unless the agency proves by clear and convincing 
evidence that it is not “readily reproducible.” Nonexempt substantive metadata may 
include, for example, data that “instructs” a computer with respect to the fonts and 
formatting to be displayed on screen or in a hard copy printout of an e-record.145 
Data governing an agency e-record’s formatting may facilitate meaningful access to 
government e-records, which counsels in favor of a higher evidentiary burden for 
cases in which a requester actually seeks it.146 Where the government cannot meet 
this burden, the court should require the agency to disclose the requested e-records 
in static format with accompanying load files containing the requested nonexempt 
substantive metadata. 
                                                          
142 See § 552(a)(4)(B) (“[T]he court . . . may examine the contents of . . . agency records in 
camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the 
exemptions set forth in [§ 552(b)], and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.” (emphasis 
added)). 
143 See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 251 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) (“[T]he burden [that] FOIA specifically places on the Government to show that the 
information withheld is exempt from disclosure [under § 552(b) requires the government to] provide a 
relatively detailed justification, specifically identifying the reasons why a particular exemption is 
relevant and correlating those claims with the particular part of a withheld document to which they 
apply.” (emphasis added)). 
144 See Meltzer, supra note 12, at 358 (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. United States Forest Serv., 
861 F.2d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
145 See Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div., 255 F.R.D. 350, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (noting that because of the substantive information contained within substantive metadata, it 
“need not be routinely produced [in non-FOIA litigation,] unless the requesting party shows good 
cause” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Meltzer, supra note 12, at 332. 
146 Of course, public access to exempt substantive metadata would have incredible power to 
advance government transparency. But FOIA provides only for qualified—not absolute—government 
transparency. Congress thought it necessary to expressly exempt pre-decisional and deliberative agency 
records from disclosure under FOIA. Federal courts are, therefore, powerless to override this exemption. 
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3. Whether Embedded Metadata Is “Readily Reproducible” 
With respect to FOIA disputes over embedded metadata, federal courts should 
allow the government to avoid disclosure by way of a lighter showing of burden, 
with one exception for “essential” embedded metadata. 
Embedded metadata is unique because it exists only within, and generally 
cannot be removed from, its related e-record’s “native file.”147 Consequently, a 
presumption favoring the disclosure of agency embedded metadata necessarily 
extends to the disclosure of agency native files—a proposition fraught with 
controversy. Information redacted from most native formats is “never fully deleted 
from the file and can be recovered” or “un-redact[ed]” with relative ease.148 As a 
result, requiring embedded metadata (and, thus, native file) production under FOIA 
has potential to “open the floodgates for the inadvertent release of confidential 
[agency] information” ineffectually redacted from native files.149 E-records in 
native format may also be difficult to “Bates” number,150 and the requester may not 
have access to the software necessary to open the e-record in native format.151 
These factors counsel in favor of a lighter evidentiary burden for the agency 
opposing production. 
In certain circumstances, however, embedded metadata may provide the only 
means through which the public can access a government e-record meaningfully. 
The archetypal example is a request for embedded metadata underlying an Excel 
spreadsheet, in which case embedded metadata is commonly essential to 
understanding the spreadsheet in its entirety.152 Under these circumstances, 
                                                          
147 SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY 3D, supra note 20, at 19. 
148 Meltzer, supra note 12, at 345–55 (discussing, in detail, the implications of compelled native 
file disclosure under FOIA). This article is from 2009, but my research did not uncover any new, 
improved technology related to native file redaction. 
149 Id. 
150 For a definition of “Bates” numbering, see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 80, at 172 
(“Bates-stamp number[:] The identifying number that is affixed to a document or to the individual pages 
of a document. The term gets its name from a self-advancing stamp machine made by the Bates 
Manufacturing Company. The number is typically used to identify documents produced during 
discovery—Often shortened to Bates number; Bates stamp.”). 
151 See Aguilar, 255 F.R.D. at 356. 
152 See supra note 33 (describing the difficulties associated with understanding Excel 
spreadsheets without embedded metadata); cf. Fagel v. Dep’t of Transp., 991 N.E.2d 365, 372 (Ill. App. 
Ct.), cert. denied, 996 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. 2013) (state agency violated Illinois’ freedom of information law 
by furnishing a “locked” version of an Excel spreadsheet missing key pieces of embedded metadata); 
Aguilar, 255 F.R.D. at 355 (noting embedded metadata is generally considered “crucial” to 
understanding certain e-records, for example, “complicated” Excel spreadsheets, which may be 
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requesters should have an opportunity to rebut the government’s showing that 
embedded metadata is not “readily reproducible.” 
Procedurally, therefore, the government should be able to meet its initial 
burden that requested, nonexempt embedded metadata is not “readily reproducible” 
with proof satisfying the preponderance of the evidence standard.153 If the 
government makes this initial showing, the burden should shift to the requester to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the information contained in the 
requested embedded metadata is: (1) essential to understanding the e-record to 
which it relates; (2) qualitatively irreplaceable when compared to any other agency 
metadata to which the requester has access under FOIA; and (3) actually accessible 
using the requester’s electronic information resources, as determined as of the time 
of the initial FOIA request. If the requester fails to prove all three factors, the court 
should not require disclosure of the requested e-record in native format but may 
order disclosure in static format. If, however, the requester proves all three factors, 
the burden should shift back to the government to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that production of the requested e-record in native format will present 
actual, substantial national security or privacy risks that cannot be remedied 
through FOIA’s exemptions and the agency’s actual, reasonable redaction efforts. 
Only if the government fails to satisfy this final burden should the court require the 
government to disclose the requested e-record in native format, which will 
necessarily include embedded metadata. This framework will protect the public’s 
interest in accessing essential embedded metadata while accounting for the 
government’s concerns with respect to ineffectual native file redaction. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As noted by commentator Ari Schwartz, “[a]ccess to [government] 
information inevitably implicates other interests—in particular, cost, privacy, and 
security.”154 “Too often,” however, “these important issues are unnecessarily seen 
                                                                                                                                      
“difficult to comprehend” without the ability to view the metadata formulae underlying the output in 
each cell). 
153 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 80, at 1301 (“[P]reponderance of the evidence[:] 
[S]uperior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable 
doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the 
other.”); Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence 
Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (1983) (“In most civil cases, the requisite degree of persuasion 
is ‘by a preponderance of the evidence.’ This traditionally requires demonstrating that the existence of 
the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.”). 
154 Ari Schwartz, Using Open Internet Standards to Provide Greater Access in a Post-9/11 
World, 2 ISJLP 125, 135 (2006), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2012/02/ 
Schwartz___Final__formatted_.pdf. 
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as competing with [government] openness”—the purpose for which Congress 
enacted FOIA in 1966.155 As discussed throughout this article, metadata can be a 
powerful tool to advance government transparency and accountability under FOIA. 
Upon reasonable request, therefore, the public should have a presumptive 
right to readily reproducible agency metadata under FOIA—absent affirmative 
proof of substantial burden or express FOIA exemption—because: (1) the public 
has an interest in meaningful access to government e-records in optimal formats; 
(2) the express language of FOIA supports such a presumption; and (3) the line 
between “metadata” and the e-“record” to which it relates is illusory. 
The presumption and legal framework I set forth above may help resolve 
FOIA’s democrat dilemma by furthering the public’s interest in federal government 
transparency while protecting the government’s legitimate interests in reducing 
costs and protecting privacy and national security. This balanced solution would 
advance one of our nation’s “most essential principles”: that democracy “works 
best when the people have all the information that the security of the [United 
States] permits.”156 
                                                          
155 Id. 
156 Johnson, supra note 3. 
